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NSC BRIEFING

20 January 1960

EVALUATION OF KHRUSHCHEV SPEECH

- I. USIB is making very careful evaluation of speech Khrushchev gave to Supreme Soviet 14 January. In meantime, here is CIA's preliminary analysis.
- II. We are inclined to accept Khrushchev's statements on manpower strength and military hardware production.
  - A. Although his figure of 3.6 million men in the armed forces about 600,000 lower than our estimate, there has been downward trend in available military manpower for some years, and 3.6 million figure quite reasonable.
  - B. We have observed virtual cessation of bomber production and sharp cutbacks in fighter production and output of naval vessels.
    1. However, several new classes of submarines known to be under construction, and increased output expected.
- III. We also believe that reduction of 1.2 million men <sup>probably</sup> will be carried out, within the two years Khrushchev gave as an outside limit. (Defense Minister Malinovsky says by "autumn 1961.")
  - A. Reduction makes good sense both economically and militarily, and has some propaganda advantages. (~~Its desirability has~~ apparently become evident since last March, when Khrushchev said "we are not going to reduce our armed forces further.")
  - B. Most serious flaws in Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) were:

DOCUMENT NO. 14  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  
X OCT 1965  
CIA'S CURRENT CLASS. C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE  
AUTH. NS 70-2  
DATE REVIEWED 572044

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1. Competition for resources between military and investment programs in years 1960-62.
  2. Shortage in industrial manpower caused by low World War II birthrate.
  - C. Khrushchev's new program <sup>helps to</sup> meets these difficulties, ~~makes it probable~~ that plan will be over fulfilled.
  - D. Reduction in explicit military budget of 16-17 billion rubles, <sup>at about 10% of total</sup> as Khrushchev proposed, frees substantial resources for use elsewhere (Khrushchev says for industry, consumer goods, and foreign aid).
  - E. However, these additional resources not immediately translatable into missiles and do not affect our estimate of 140-200 ICBMs available by mid-61.
- IV. Soviet military establishment in for thorough reorganization.
- A. In private remarks, Khrushchev has often shown impatience with military advice he is getting.
    1. He has called surface ships "floating coffins" and has disparaged manned bombers.
    2. On the other hand, he has clearly become a missile enthusiast.
  - B. Although there has been considerable rationalization of Soviet forces in the last few years, he has apparently decided pace not fast enough.
    1. Force structure becoming out-of-balance for rapidly-evolving modern warfare and remains a heavy burden on economy.

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- C. Thus military to get same sort of abrupt rationalization given to economic structure in 1957.
- D. Malinovsky, speaking immediately after Khrushchev, described the new program as follows:

"Rocket troops...are undoubtedly the main type of armed forces, however...it is not possible to solve all tasks of war with one type of troops...we are retaining at a definite strength and in relevant proportions all types of our armed forces..."
- V. What these strengths and proportions will be is not yet clear.
  - A. Khrushchev's apparent goal for force structure is:
    - 1. Strategic attack and air defense forces armed entirely with missiles.
    - 2. A navy composed principally of submarines and anti-submarine surface forces.
    - 3. A ground force, equipped with tactical missiles, with greater firepower, and presumably with a much increased airborne capability.
  - B. However, the new manpower reduction leaves his military planners with some tight choices.
    - 1. Maintenance of strong ground forces appears to require rapid cut-backs in present air, and to some extent, naval strength.
    - 2. It is quite possible that present manned bomber threat against US will be liquidated, but we think this would be timed with developing missile capability.

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3. Also we considering whether sizable withdrawals of forces from East Europe may be undertaken.
- C. Malinovsky has stated that 1.2 million reduction includes "upwards of 250,000" officers.
  1. This an extremely high proportion, and consistent with reduction in air units (where officer ratio high).
  2. It also suggests deactivation of cadre-strength ground units
- VI. Such a program obviously not very palatable to traditionally conservative Soviet military. We think Khrushchev may have had to overcome considerable opposition.
  - A. He and other speakers at Supreme Soviet went to unnecessary lengths to justify proposal, to reassure Soviet people that USSR not endangered, and to promise those ticketed for demobilization that they will be taken care of.
  - B. Although Khrushchev was followed to Supreme Soviet rostrum by parade of generals believed to be his protégés, we note that Marshals Sokolovsky (Chief of Staff), Konev (First Deputy Defense Minister and head of Warsaw Pact) and Grechko (Chief of Ground Forces) did not speak.
    1. While we have no evidence of direct connection between announcement of Kirichenko's demotion and force reduction, timing of such announcements often meaningful in Soviet politics.
  - C. Tuesday, rally in support of troop reduction was held at headquarters Moscow Military District, attended by no less than five Presidium members.

-4-

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1. Such meetings not common--last one was held in 1957 when Zhukov removed.

D. However, we believe any political resistance to Khrushchev's program has by now been overcome.

VII. General tone of Khrushchev's speech reflects confidence in growing Soviet strength.

A. Reinforces our view that he believes USSR can overcome capitalism without involvement in general war.

1. He appears to view missile force he is building as deterrent behind which Soviet economic strength can be built and Soviet world political offensive conducted.
2. But Khrushchev for the first time explicitly excludes general war as no longer within framework of rational policy for "modern means of waging war do not give any country" an advantage. There would be not a single capital, not a single major industrial or administrative center, not a single strategic area which would not be subject to attack...during the first minutes of the war."

VIII. Final point is way in which Khrushchev's speech aimed at US:

A. Shows familiarity with Washington political scene.

1. Jibes at US budget debate, drug cost investigation.

B. Speech praises President Eisenhower, and does not mention Vice-President Nixon, but bitterly attacks Truman, Acheson, and especially Rockefeller.

1. Latter "wanted to ride into White House on the cold war charger," but realized this impossible in current detente atmosphere and withdrew. But withdrawal "may

be only a maneuver."

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